An unprecedented slowdown? by Bharat Trehan
FABSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 92-19, May 8, 1992
An Unprecedented Slowdown?
low 2 percent since the second quarter of1989.
And this is an unusual performance by historical
standards. According to Runkle (1991), the cur-
rent slowdown is already eleven quarters long,
and no other postwar slowdown has lasted more
than seven quarters. (He defines a "slowdown"
as a period in which real output grows at a rate
below 3.2 percent, the average rate for the post-
war u.s. economy.)
Chart 1 presents data on real GOP growth over
three-year intervals to allow an easy comparison
between the recent slowdown and earlier epi-
sodes. More precisely, the chart shows the per-
centage increase in real GOP over the prior three
years for every quarter over the 1962.Ql-1991.Q4
interval. Given that real GOP data at this point
go back only to 1959, measuring growth over the
prior three years implies that the charts begin in
1962.Q1. The chart shows that the worst decline
in real GOP growth (over a three-year period)
occurred in 1982. The next worse performance is
the current slowdown; for the last year or so real
GOP growth has remained below the levels of
the 1969-1970 and 1974-1975 recessions. Thus,
the comparison in the chart reveals that things
are somewhat worse than would be suggested by
a simple comparison of real GOP growth in this
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Although the recession was not unusually deep,
it occurred during the longest period ofslow
economic growth in postwar U.s. history-the
annual growth rate of real GOP has remained be-
This Weekly Letter looks at the data to determine
how well the economy has been doing recently
compared to past recessions. It turns out that
unusually slow growth of the economy's work
force is an important reason why the most recent
three-year period looks worse than similar periods
around other recessions. Further, this slowdown
in the growth rate of the work force appears to
be unrelated to recent developments in the econ-
omy. An important implication is that monetary
and fiscal policies cannot be used to offset the
effects of these (demographic) changes on the
growth rate of real output.
Sluggish GDP growth
Most experts believe that the economy bottomed
out somewhere in the second quarter of1991. If
this is correct, then the recession of1990-91 was
relatively mild. McNees (1992) ofthe Boston Fed
points outthat the declines in real output and
employment were about half as large as the aver-
age decline over prior postwar recessions, while
the increase in the unemployment rate was
smaller than in any other recession. (The un-
employment rate did reach a higher level than
during the 1953 or the 1969-1970 recessions.)
In comparison to other postwar recessions in the
U.S., the recession of1990-1991 could be con-
sidered "mild." Real output declined by around
1Y2 percent over the last quarter of 1990 and the
first quarter of1991, and since then has grown at
a sluggish rate. In other recessions, the average
real output decline was about twice that rate.
Yet pessimism about the prospects for the u.s.
economy persists. One explanation is that this
recession occurred during the country's longest
period of slow economic growth. The growth rate
or real gross domestic product (GOP) has been
below 2 percent for eleven straight quarters now
(that is, every quarter since the second quarter of
1989), which is a first for the u.s. economy in the
postwar era.FRBSF
'Labor force is defined to include discouraged workers.
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To see whether there is an unusually high num-
ber of discouraged workers right now, Chart 3
presents the ratio of discouraged workers to the
augmented labor force. (Oata on discouraged
workers is only available since 1970.) The aug-
mented labor force is defined as the sum of the
labor force plus discouraged workers in order to
prevent the measured labor force from becoming
artificially small during recessions. The chart
shows no evidence to suggest that the discour-
aged worker problem is especially acute at this
time; in fact, the plotted ratio is lower than it has
Chart 3
Ratio of Discouraged Workers to
Labor Force*
Chart 2
Real GDP Per Worker*
3-Year Growth
The implications ofthis finding depend upon
what is behind this slowdown in growth. For
instance, we can think of slow real GOP growth
as resulting either from a decline in the average
worker's productivity, or from a reduction in the
number ofworkers. Slow real GOP growth due
to a decline in productivity growth would bea
problem, since it could then have implications
for individuals' living standards. But, if slow real
GOP growth were due to slower growth in the
work force that is unrelated to economic de-
velopments, then it would not have the same
adverse implications for individuals' living
standards.
Adjusting for changes in the work force
In looking at real GOP growth in terms of pro-
ductivity growth and work force growth, it is
critical to choose the right measure of the work
force. For example, looking at real GOP per em-
ployed worker (oreven real GOP per hour worked)
could give too optimistic a picture ofthe decline
in real GOP during a slowdown, because the
number of employed workers declines during a
slowdown. Therefore, we need a measure of the
work force that is as independent of economic
conditions as possible.
A reasonable starting point is the labor force,
which includes employed workers as well as
those who are looking for employment. Chart 2
shows the growth in real GOP per member ofthe
labor force over a three-year period and reveals
that, once we adjust for changes in the labor
force, the recent slowdown no longer looks so
bad; in fact, it is the mildest of the five recessions
on record. Thus, unusually slow labor force
growth seems to be an important contributor to
slow real GDP growth over the past three years.
It is possible that using the labor force to deflate
real GOP understates the extent of the recent de-
terioration ofthe economy. The problem is that
the measured labor force is not completely inde-
pendent of recent economic developments either.
For example, it does not account for "discour-
aged workers:' Ifan unusually large number of
people are discouraged about the prospects of
finding a job because of the length of the latest
slowdown, then the !aborforce may be smaller
than normal at this stage)n the cycle. In that
case, deflating real GOP by the labor force would
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'Individuals 16 years of age or older.
Runkle, David. 1991. "A Bleak Outlook for the u.s.
Economy." Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review (Fall).
quite a while or that the recovery so far has been
noticeably weaker than the average postwar
recovery. Instead, this analysis shows that part of
the reason for slow output growth over the past
few years has to do with a slowdown in the
growth of the economy's work force. This has
important implications for the conduct of policy.
While monetary and fiscal policies can be used
to offset the effects of deficient demand in the
economy, they cannot be used to offset slower
output growth resulting from demographic
changes in the economy's work force.
McNees, Stephen K. 1992. "The 1990-91 Recession in
Historical Perspective:' New England Economic
Review Uanuary/February).
To control for this possible bias, Chart 4 plots the
growth of real GOP per adult, defined as an indi-
vidual who is 16 years of age or older. Since the
adult population is completely independent of
short-run developments in the economy, its use
avoids some ofthe problems caused by using the
labor force to deflate real output. At the same
time, it should be kept in mind that the adult
popuiation is not the correct measure of the
economy's work force either, since it includes
people who are not looking for work.
Chart4 shows that the recent behavior of real
GOP per adult is not worse than it has been dur-
ing prior recessions. Thus, the inference from
Chart2-that the growth of real GOP per worker
during the last three years is no worse than that
observed during prior recessions-appears to be
appropriate. This implies that some ofthe unusu-
ally slow growth of real GOP over the last three
years is simply the result of changes in the U.S.
work force that are unrelated to current eco-
nomic conditions. These changes have no impli-
cations for the productivity of u.s. workers.
Conclusion
It is worth reiterating what this Letter does not try
to show. The results presented here are not meant
to deny that the economy has been sluggish for
been after any other recession. Nor does the
increase in discouraged workers since the begin-
ning of the recession appear to be unusually
large this time around.
A second potential problem with using the labor
force to deflate real GOP involves recent de-
clines in the participation rate. One hypothesis
about the decline is that younger workers are dis-
couraged by the state ofthe economy and have
decided to go back to school. If this is true, they
would not show up in the discouraged worker
count, but they would make the measured labor
force smaller than it would otherwise be and
thus would tend to make Chart 2 look better than
it otherwise would.
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